Definition
In legal usage, "another" means any other person or entity — not merely a different individual, but any distinct legal person, including corporations, governments, and public bodies. The term appears frequently in criminal statutes, tort law, and civil pleadings, where its scope determines who qualifies as a protected party or potential victim.
1. In statutory construction: "Another" is construed broadly to include any legal person separate from the actor, including governmental entities. Courts have rejected narrow readings that limit the term to private individuals when the statutory context protects a broader class.
2. In case captions and pleadings: "Another" is a conventional shorthand used in case titles to indicate an unnamed co-party — as in "Smith v. Jones and Another" — signaling that additional parties exist without naming them in the caption.
3. In property and theft law: "Another," as used in theft and larceny statutes, encompasses any owner other than the defendant, including the government. The possessory interest of any distinct legal person suffices to satisfy the element.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): One more of a kind already present; a different or additional one; used indefinitely for any other.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): One more in addition to a former number; not the same; any or some other person, indefinitely.
The common meaning of "another" suggests an additional individual or a different person — implicitly human and private. Legal usage expands this considerably: in statutory and criminal contexts, "another" has been interpreted to include the state and other public bodies, and courts have specifically rejected the inference that surrounding personal pronouns restrict the term to natural persons. The ordinary reader would not expect a government to qualify as "another" in a fraud or theft provision; the legal reader must assume it does unless the statute expressly limits the term.
Common Confusion
"Another" and "other" are sometimes used interchangeably in drafting, but they carry distinct structural implications. "Another" typically refers to a single additional or different entity; "other" may be plural or relational. In case caption practice, "and another" signals one unnamed co-party, while "and others" signals multiple. Researchers reading historical pleadings should note which form was used, as it may bear on the number of parties involved.
Why It Matters in Research
The primary research trap with "another" is jurisdictional and interpretive underreach — assuming the term excludes government entities or public bodies because surrounding statutory language uses personal pronouns. The Kentucky decision quoted in Bouvier's is a direct warning: courts have explicitly held that the use of "him" or "his" elsewhere in a statute does not narrow "another" to private individuals. Researchers working on fraud, theft, or injury-to-property statutes should always check whether the relevant jurisdiction has addressed whether governmental entities fall within "another."
In historical sources, "another" also appears without analysis in theft and larceny provisions where the key question is possessory interest — who qualifies as the victim-owner. The 1790 federal larceny act construction noted by Anderson illustrates that early federal courts read "another" expansively to include the United States as a protected party, a reading that cascaded through later federal criminal law.
In case caption research, "and another" in older English and some American practice is a formal convention, not a vague description. If a researcher is trying to identify all parties to a historical case, a caption using "and another" is a flag that at least one party is not identified in the title and must be located in the body of the record.
Cross-corpus note: This term surfaces in Law Mind materials across criminal law, civil procedure, and statutory interpretation contexts. Its meaning is almost never the focus of extended analysis — it appears as a given — which makes the moments when courts do analyze it especially significant for understanding statutory scope.
Historical Dictionary Support
Bouvier's and Anderson's agree on the functional core: "another" means one other, any other, any person distinct from the actor. Both sources illustrate the term through specific legal applications rather than abstract definition, which is characteristic of their approach to common-use legal words.
Bouvier's contribution is specifically interpretive — citing a Kentucky court's holding that "another" in a criminal statute extends to the State itself, and that this reading survives even when the surrounding clause uses personal pronouns. This is the most legally significant point in the historical record for this term and is not something the ordinary definition would suggest.
Anderson's adds two useful dimensions: the federal larceny application (United States as "another" under the 1790 act) and the case caption convention. Anderson also cross-references ALIUS and ALIOS, the Latin equivalents, which is a reminder that researchers working in older materials — particularly ecclesiastical, admiralty, or early common law sources — may encounter the Latin forms where modern sources would use "another."
What the historical dictionaries do not address: neither Bouvier's nor Anderson's discusses the term in contract law (where "another" might define the counterparty in a bilateral obligation) or in procedural rules (where "another action pending" or "another court" carry specific meanings). Researchers should not assume the historical treatment is exhaustive.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
See Law Mind Encyclopedia: Statutory Construction; Larceny and Theft (Historical); Parties to an Action.