Definition
An alternative obligation is a legal obligation in which the obligor owes one of two (or more) distinct performances, with the performance of either fully satisfying the obligation. The obligor is bound, but not to a single fixed act — the obligation is discharged when one of the specified alternatives is completed.
The defining feature is the disjunctive structure: the object of the contract is expressed as "A or B," and full performance of either A or B extinguishes the obligation entirely. A promise to deliver a particular chattel or to pay a sum of money is the classical example. Until a choice is made and performed, the obligation remains alive as to both alternatives.
By default, the right of election — the choice of which alternative to perform — belongs to the obligor (the party bound). The parties may contract otherwise, assigning the election to the obligee, but this must be established expressly.
Common Confusion
ALTERNATIVE OBLIGATION vs. FACULTATIVE OBLIGATION
These two are frequently conflated in civil law sources, and the distinction is not always clearly drawn in historical dictionaries.
In an alternative obligation, both performances are genuinely owed in the alternative from the outset — neither is primary. If one alternative becomes impossible, the law must determine whether the obligation is extinguished or the obligor is simply compelled to perform the remaining alternative (the answer varies by which party holds the election and who caused the impossibility).
In a facultative obligation, only one performance is actually owed; the obligor has the option to substitute a different performance instead. The substitute is not truly "owed" — it is a privilege of substitution. If the primary object perishes, the obligor cannot compel the obligee to accept the substitute, and the obligation is extinguished. This asymmetry is the key practical difference.
Researchers working in Louisiana law and civil law treatises will encounter both terms. Common law sources largely ignore the facultative/alternative distinction and fold both concepts under general contract flexibility doctrines.
Core Elements
Inclusion is warranted here because alternative obligations have a formal civil-law structure with specific legal rules attached to each element.
1. Two or more distinct objects of performance. The alternatives must be genuinely different acts or things — not merely modes of performing the same thing. If the alternatives are the same performance expressed differently, courts may treat the obligation as simple.
2. Disjunctive expression. The alternatives are separated by "or," not "and." A conjunctive obligation requiring both performances is a simple cumulative obligation, not an alternative one.
3. Election right. One party holds the right to choose which alternative satisfies the obligation. The default rule across civil law systems is that election belongs to the obligor. The instrument may assign it to the obligee.
4. Full discharge upon performance. Completion of either alternative fully satisfies the obligation. The obligee cannot demand both.
5. Consequences of impossibility. If one alternative becomes impossible:
— When the obligor holds the election: the obligor must perform the remaining possible alternative.
— When the obligee holds the election: the obligee may choose the remaining alternative or, in some systems, claim damages if the impossibility was the obligor's fault.
Why It Matters in Research
This term is primarily a civil law concept, and researchers will encounter it almost exclusively in Louisiana law, the Romanist tradition, and comparative law materials. Common law jurisdictions largely lack a formal doctrinal category called "alternative obligation" — the same commercial arrangements exist, but they are analyzed under general contract principles such as conditions, discharge, and election of remedies, not under a named obligation type.
The practical research trap is assuming that Black's Dictionary treatment of this term reflects general American law. It does not. Black's entry (through most editions) draws directly from the Louisiana Civil Code, and the term carries technical civil law weight in that context that it does not carry in, for example, New York or English contract law.
When researching historical Louisiana materials, the distinction between alternative and facultative obligations matters for impossibility and risk of loss analysis. Researchers working in the Louisiana corpus should connect this term to the Civil Code articles governing obligations and look for the specific election-of-alternatives provisions there.
For comparative law research, this concept maps closely to obligations alternatives in French law (Code civil, Book III) and to the Roman law concept of obligatio alternativa. If a source is translating or adapting French or Roman doctrine, the term carries that theoretical freight.
The term also appears, usually loosely, in some common law commercial contexts — particularly negotiable instruments and debt settlement — where a debtor may satisfy an obligation in one of two specified ways. Researchers should be cautious: such common law uses invoke the practical concept without the civil law doctrinal structure.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's and Rapalje & Lawrence are in close agreement on the core definition, and neither departs from the other in any substantive way. Both define the term as an obligation binding the obligor to one of two things at the obligor's election, with either performance satisfying the instrument.
Black's is more informative in that it acknowledges the Louisiana Civil Code as its source and provides an illustrative example (deliver a thing or pay a sum of money), which Rapalje & Lawrence omits. That example is useful — it anchors the concept in a recognizable commercial transaction rather than leaving it abstract.
Neither source addresses the facultative/alternative distinction, the consequences of partial impossibility, or the assignment of election to the obligee. Researchers relying solely on these entries will miss the more nuanced doctrine that governs how alternative obligations behave when circumstances change. For that analysis, the Louisiana Civil Code itself and civil law treatises are indispensable supplements.
Jurisdictional Note
Alternative obligation as a formal legal category is operative primarily in Louisiana, which follows the civil law tradition. Common law jurisdictions achieve similar commercial results through contract drafting and general principles but do not recognize alternative obligation as a distinct doctrinal category. Comparative law researchers will find close analogues in French, Spanish, and Latin American civil codes.