Definition
Agross is an archaic legal term describing the character of a right of way or similar easement that runs entirely across a parcel of land — that is, entering on one side and exiting on the opposite side. A grant of a right of way "agross" a lot does not permit the grantee to enter at one point and exit at another point on the same side of the property. The traversal must be complete, passing through the lot from one boundary to the opposite boundary.
The term is closely associated with the construction of easement grants. When a deed or instrument conveys a right of way "across" a parcel, courts have interpreted that language to require a true crossing — not a partial incursion and return. A grantee who enters, travels partway through the land, and exits on the same side from which entry was made has not exercised a right of way "agross" the lot; that conduct would exceed or mischaracterize the grant.
Common Confusion
Agross should not be confused with "in gross," a separate and well-developed real property term describing an easement that is personal to the holder rather than appurtenant to a dominant estate. The two terms are visually and phonetically unrelated in meaning. "In gross" concerns whether an easement is tied to land ownership; "agross" concerns the physical scope and direction of a right of way traversal.
Why It Matters in Research
This term appears almost exclusively in older American easement and real property cases, particularly from New England jurisdictions in the early-to-mid nineteenth century. Researchers working with historical deed language, colonial-era land grants, or early American property disputes should be alert to the word appearing as a spelling variant or phonetic rendering of "across" — but carrying a precise legal construction that courts treated as definitional to the scope of the easement.
The critical research trap is treating "agross" as merely a quaint spelling of "across" and missing its legal force. Courts using this term were not simply describing direction of travel — they were establishing a limiting principle: the grantee's rights are bounded by the nature of a true traversal. A partial crossing, or a crossing that doubles back to the point of entry, falls outside the grant.
Researchers should also note that the term does not appear in the main body of Black's Law Dictionary second edition but is captured only in the supplemental material, which means it may be invisible to researchers relying on the primary alphabetical text. Corpus searches for easement disputes involving this term should also search for "across" in early deed-interpretation cases, as courts frequently moved between the two forms without distinguishing them orthographically.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary (2nd Ed., Supplemental) provides the sole dictionary treatment of this term in the Law Mind corpus. The entry is spare but precise, built around the holding in Comstock v. Van Deusen, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 163, which established that a right-of-way grant across a lot does not authorize the grantee to enter at one point and exit at another point on the same side. The supplemental entry also references Brown v. Meady, 10 Me. 391, 25 Am. Dec. 248, indicating the principle was recognized in Maine courts as well — suggesting the interpretive rule had some regional currency in early New England property law.
No other historical dictionary in the standard shelf sources — not Bouvier, not the earlier editions of Black's — appears to carry a standalone entry for this term. Its appearance only in the supplemental material of the second edition suggests it was a term of limited but real currency: precise enough to warrant definitional treatment, but not so widely used as to merit inclusion in the main text. The historical sources do not address the term's relationship to the broader doctrine of easement scope or appurtenant versus in gross easements, which is a gap researchers should fill by moving into treatise and case law sources directly.
Jurisdictional Note
The documented case law is Massachusetts and Maine, both early nineteenth century. The underlying interpretive principle — that a grant of a right of way "across" land implies a full traversal — is consistent with general easement construction doctrine in American common law, but researchers should not assume the specific term "agross" carries formal weight in modern jurisdictions.