ADMINISTERING POISON

2 definitions found across Law Mind sources

ADMINISTERING POISONAuthored
The Law Mind • 1127 words
Definition
Administering poison is a criminal offense consisting of the unlawful and malicious delivery, introduction, or causing to be taken by another person of any poison or other destructive substance. The offense targets the act of getting poison into another's body—whether by direct administration or by causing the victim to ingest it unknowingly—regardless of whether death or serious injury results. Most formulations of the offense capture both completed acts and attempts, meaning liability attaches even when the poison fails to produce its intended effect. The offense is distinct from murder or attempted murder by poison, though the same underlying conduct may give rise to charges under either framework depending on outcome and intent. Administering poison is typically charged as a standalone statutory offense, allowing prosecution where proof of murderous intent or a resulting death cannot be established.
Common Confusion
ADMINISTERING POISON vs. MURDER/ATTEMPTED MURDER BY POISON: These offenses overlap in conduct but differ in what the prosecution must prove. Murder by poison requires proof of intent to kill and, in a completed murder charge, the victim's death. Administering poison as a standalone offense generally requires only that the act was done unlawfully and maliciously, without requiring proof that death was intended or that serious harm resulted. This distinction was practically important when English statutes created administering poison as an intermediate offense, allowing conviction where juries might hesitate to return a murder verdict. ADMINISTERING POISON vs. POISONING: Researchers will encounter both formulations in historical sources. "Poisoning" in older texts often refers broadly to the act or to the result (death by poison), while "administering poison" is the technically precise statutory language describing the conduct element. Do not treat the two as always interchangeable when reading statutory or indictment language.
Core Elements
The standard formulation, reflected in the English statute noted by Bouvier and carried forward in American statutory variants, requires: 1. UNLAWFULNESS: The act was not authorized or consented to in a lawful manner (e.g., not a therapeutic administration by a physician acting within proper authority, though consent by the victim is not always a complete defense). 2. MALICE: The act was done with malicious intent—a deliberate, wrongful purpose. This does not necessarily require intent to kill; intent to injure, harm, or act recklessly with knowledge of danger has been sufficient under many formulations. 3. ADMINISTRATION OR CAUSING TO BE TAKEN: The offense reaches both direct administration (the defendant personally delivers the substance) and indirect administration (the defendant causes a third party or mechanism to deliver it to the victim). Attempt is separately captured in most statutes. 4. A POISON OR DESTRUCTIVE THING: The substance must qualify as a poison or other destructive thing. Historical cases debated which substances met this threshold, and courts examined whether the quantity administered was capable of harm.
Why It Matters in Research
The primary research trap is treating this as a common-law offense when it is almost entirely a creature of statute. Bouvier's entry points directly to the English statute (9 George IV, c. 31, s. 11) as the operative source. American researchers must locate the applicable state statute, since there is no uniform federal analog for the basic poison-administration offense outside specific contexts (such as poisoning food or water supplies, which has its own federal statutory treatment). Historical sources are incomplete here. Bouvier's entry is truncated, cutting off mid-sentence in the middle of a case discussion. Researchers relying on Bouvier alone will not find a full analysis of the elements or any judicial interpretation. This gap means you cannot treat the historical dictionary entry as authoritative on how courts actually applied the offense. The offense's historical significance in Anglo-American law lies partly in its function as a prosecutorial fallback. In the 19th century, English courts and legislatures recognized that juries were reluctant to convict for murder in poisoning cases where intent to kill was contested or where the victim survived. Statutes like 9 George IV c. 31 created intermediate offenses that allowed conviction on less than a full murder charge. Understanding this legislative purpose is essential for reading both English and early American cases involving poison. For American historical research, look for the offense in state criminal codes under headings like "offenses against the person," "assault," or standalone poison statutes. The offense may also appear embedded in general malicious mischief or poisoning-of-food-and-water-supply statutes, which have a different regulatory character than the personal-violence offense covered here. Researchers should also be alert to the expansion of related doctrine in modern toxic tort and environmental law, which addresses poisoning in a civil rather than criminal frame and operates under entirely different analytical rules.
Historical Dictionary Support
Bouvier's Law Dictionary is the primary historical source available here, and its entry is instructive in what it shows and what it omits. Bouvier correctly identifies the statutory basis of the offense, quotes the operative language from 9 George IV c. 31, s. 11, and signals that a case arose under the statute—but the entry breaks off before completing the case analysis. This is a genuine limitation. Researchers should not treat Bouvier's entry as a complete statement of the law; it establishes the statutory framework but does not deliver the judicial gloss. The quoted statutory language—"unlawfully and maliciously shall administer, or attempt to administer, to any person, or shall cause to be taken by any person, any poison or other destructive thing"—is historically significant because it captures the breadth of the offense's reach: direct, indirect, and attempted administration are all swept in. This structure influenced American statutory drafting. No other historical dictionary sources are available in the corpus for this term. Black's Law Dictionary and other American dictionaries that would round out the comparative picture are not represented in the source material for this entry.
Jurisdictional Note
The offense is almost entirely statutory, and its precise elements vary by jurisdiction. English law developed the offense through 19th-century legislation later consolidated in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. American states enacted their own variants, some closely tracking the English model, others embedding poison administration within broader assault or attempted murder statutes. Federal law addresses specific poisoning scenarios (contamination of food, water, or drug supplies) through separate statutes that are not coextensive with the general offense.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
The Law Mind Torts & Personal Injury Encyclopedia: Toxic Torts and Environmental Torts — Lead Paint and Lead Poisoning Liability (torts_185) — relevant for civil liability frameworks involving harmful substance exposure, which intersect with but are analytically distinct from the criminal offense.
Related Terms
Attempt (criminal) — Malice aforethought — Assault with intent to kill — Murder — Manslaughter — Poison (as evidentiary and definitional matter) — Offenses against the person — Toxic torts — Mens rea — Unlawful act
ADMINISTERING POISONmain
Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928
An offence of an aggravated character, punish- able under the various statutes defining the offence. The stat. 9 G. IV. c. 31, s. 11, enacts "that if any person unlawfully and maliciously shall administer, or attempt to administer, to any person, or shall cause to be taken by any person, any poison or other destructive thing," etc., every such offender, etc. In a case which arose under this statute, it was de- cided that, to constitute the act of administering the poison, it was not absolutely necessary that there should have been a delivery to the party poisoned, but that if she took it from a place where it had been put for her by the defendant, and any part of it went into her stomach, it was an administering; 4 Carr. & P. 869; 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 114; 88 Ga. 257; 88 Va. 865; 23 Ohio St. 146; 84 N. Y. 223. The statute 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 85 enacts that "Whosoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, shall unlawfully administer to her, or cause to be taken by her, any poison, or other noxious thing," shall be guilty of felony. Upon an indictment under this section, it was proved that the woman requested the prisoner to get her some- thing to procure miscarriage, and that a drug was both given by the prisoner and taken by the woman with that intent, but that the taking was not in the presence of the prisoner. It was held, nevertheless, that the prisoner had caused the drug to be taken within the meaning of the statute; 1 Dears. & B. 127, 164. It is not suficient that the defendant merely imagined that the thing administered would have the effect intended, but it must also appear that the drug administered was either a "poison" or a "noxious thing." ADMINISTRATION (Lat. adminis- trare, to assist in). Of Estates. The management of the es- tate of an intestate, or of a testator who has no executor. 2 Bla. Com. 494; 1 Wil- liams, Ex. 401. The term is applied broadly to denote the management of an estate by an executor, and also the management of estates of minors, lunatics, etc., in those cases where trustees have been appointed by authority of law to take charge of such estates in place of the legal owners. At common law, the real estate of an intestate goes to his heirs; the personal, to his administrator. The fundamental rule is that all just debts shall be paid before any further disposition of the property; Coke, 2d Inst. 898. Originally, the king had the sole power of disposing of an intestate's goods and chat- tels.. This power he early transferred to the bishops or ordinaries; and in England it is still exercised by their legal successors, the ecclesiastical courts, who appoint administrators and superintend the admin- istration of estates; 4 Burns, Eccl. Law, 291; 2 Fonbl. Eq. 818; 1 Williams, Ex. 402. No administration of an estate is necessary where the heirs are all of age and agree to a settlement, and there are no creditors; 50 Mo. App. 85. Ad colligendum. That which is granted for collecting and preserving goods about to perish (bona peritura). The only power over these goods is under the form pre- scribed by statute. Ancillary. That which is subordinate to the principal administration, for collecting the assets of foreigners. It is taken out in the country where the assets are locally situate; 1 Wimams, Ex. [363] 6th Am. ed. note (u) cases cited; 88 Pa. 131; 11 Mass. 256, 263; 44 III. 202; 32 Barb. 190; 57 Howard Pr. 208. It will not be granted in Minnesota on the petition of a now resident creditor, there being no domestic ones, in order to collect shares of a corporation; 45 Minn. 242. An administrator in one state can sue as such in another unless ancillary letters are taken out, but this may be done after the bill is filed, by amendment; 42 Fed. Rep. 618. One who is both ancillary and domiciliary administratrix of the same estate, cannot be called on in one jurisdiction to account for assets received in the other; 19 S. E. Rep. (S. C.) 616. Cæterorum. That which is granted as to the residue of an estate, which cannot be administered under the limited power already granted; 1 Wms. Ex. 7th Am. ed. #449; 2 Hagg. 62; 4 Hagg. Eccl. 382, 386; 4 M. & G. 398; 1 Curt. Eccl. 286. It differs from administration de bonis non in this, that in cæterorum the full power granted is exercised and exhausted, while in the other the power is, for some cause, not fully exercised. Cum testamento annexo. That which is granted where no executor is named in the will, or where the one named dies, or is in- competent or unwilling to act. Such an administrator must follow the statute rules of distribution, except when otherwise di- rected by the will; Willard, Ex.; 2 Bradf. 22; 4 Mass. 634; 6 How. 59, 60. The residu- ary legatee is appointed such administrator rather than the next of kin; 2 Phil. 54, 310; 1 Ventr. 217; 4 Leigh 153; 2 Add. 352;1 Williams, Ex. 6th Am. ed. (462) notes (h) (i). De bonis non. That which is granted when the first administrator dies before having fully administered. The per

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