ADJUDICATUS - The Law Mind Legal Dictionary

ADJUDICATUSAuthored

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Definition

Adjudicatus is a Latin term from Roman and civil law meaning "one who has been adjudged" or "a person against whom judgment has been rendered." It denotes the status of a debtor or defendant who has had a formal judicial determination made against them — that is, one who has been condemned by a court's judgment and is therefore bound by its findings. In its historical usage, the term describes both the condition of having been subjected to adjudication and, more specifically, the legal consequences that flow from that judicial determination, particularly the binding effect of the judgment on the parties.

The term is most frequently encountered in discussions of res judicata and estoppel by judgment, where the question is whether a prior adjudication bars relitigation of the same matter between the same parties.

Common Confusion

Adjudicatus should not be confused with adjudicatio, which refers to the act or process of adjudication itself — the proceeding or award — rather than the status of the person against whom judgment falls. Adjudicatus describes the outcome as it attaches to a party; adjudicatio describes the judicial act. Researchers encountering either term in civil law or ecclesiastical law sources should verify which sense is operative before drawing conclusions about procedural posture or preclusive effect.

Why It Matters in Research

Researchers will encounter adjudicatus primarily in two contexts: civil law treatises and their common law annotations, and early American and English cases discussing the preclusive effect of prior judgments. The term does not have a fixed statutory definition in Anglo-American law and tends to appear as a borrowed Latin shorthand in doctrinal argument rather than as a term of art with precise statutory content.

The key research trap is anachronism. When adjudicatus appears in older common law sources, it often carries its Roman law meaning with subtle differences from modern res judicata doctrine. The scope of what a prior judgment binds — whether it extends to matters that could have been raised but were not, versus only matters actually litigated — evolved considerably between classical civil law usage and nineteenth-century common law formulation. Do not assume that an author invoking adjudicatus intends the modern American res judicata rule; the civil law tradition from which the term derives recognized different preclusive boundaries.

The Anderson's Dictionary fragment reproduced in the source material is instructive precisely on this point: it distinguishes between judgments on the same demand (where preclusion is broad, covering matters that could have been offered) and judgments on a different demand (where the prior judgment operates as an estoppel only as to the specific matters actually determined). This distinction maps onto the modern common law separation between claim preclusion and issue preclusion, but the terminology and contours were not yet stabilized in the period when adjudicatus was most actively used. Researchers citing sources from this transitional period should be alert to which doctrine a given author is actually describing.

In Roman law sources, adjudicatus also carried the specific meaning of a debtor handed over to a creditor by judicial decree — a form of personal execution that has no modern common law analogue. If you encounter the term in a translation of Justinian or a civilian commentary, this older meaning may be operative. Context is essential.

Historical Dictionary Support

Anderson's Dictionary of Law does not define adjudicatus as a freestanding entry but invokes the concept in its treatment of estoppel by judgment and res judicata. The passage preserved in the source material reflects the mid-to-late nineteenth-century American doctrinal synthesis: a prior judgment between the same parties and privies is conclusive as to every matter that was or could have been raised when the cause of action is the same, but operates only as an issue estoppel when the subsequent action rests on a different demand.

Anderson's treatment is representative of the period's approach — grounding preclusion doctrine in the Latin vocabulary of civil law while applying it through common law categories. The dictionary does not address the older Roman law meaning of adjudicatus as a judicially condemned debtor subject to personal execution, which reflects how thoroughly that meaning had receded from Anglo-American legal usage by the time Anderson was writing.

What historical sources generally miss: none of the standard nineteenth-century American legal dictionaries give adjudicatus a standalone entry with full definitional treatment. It appears as a term of art embedded in broader doctrinal discussions, which means researchers must reconstruct its meaning from context rather than relying on a single authoritative definition.

Jurisdictional Note

Because adjudicatus is a civil law term, it appears most frequently in jurisdictions with a civilian tradition — Louisiana, Quebec, and in European legal materials. In common law jurisdictions, it functions as learned Latin shorthand rather than as a term with jurisdiction-specific statutory meaning. Researchers working in mixed civil-common law jurisdictions should be particularly attentive to which tradition is informing a given source's use of the term.

ADJUDICATUSmain

Anderson's Dictionary of Law • 1890

parties and privies, as to every matter received to sustain or to defeat the claim, and as to what might have been offered for that purpose. But where the second action is upon a different demand, the former judgment is an estoppel only as to the matters in issue upon the determination of which the finding was rendered.¹ A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a question directly involved in one suit, is conclusive as to that question in another suit between the same parties. But to this operation of the judgment it must appear, from the face of the record or be shown by extrinsic evidence, that the precise question was raised and determined in the former suit. If there be any uncertainty on this head in the record, as, for example, if it appears that several distinct matters may have been litigated, upon one or more of which the judgment may have passed, with out indicating which of them was litigated and upon which the judgment was rendered, -the whole subject-matter of the action will be at large, and open to new contention, unless this uncertainty be removed by extrinsic evidence showing the precise point involved and determined. To apply the judgment and give effect to the adjudication actually made, when the record leaves the matter in doubt, such evidence is admissible.2 When the second suit involves other matter as well as the matters in issue in the former action, the former judgment operates as an estoppel as to those things which were in issue there, and upon the determination of which the first verdict was rendered. Extrinsic evidence, when not inconsistent with the record and not impugning its verity, is admissible to show that a former action involved matters in issue in the suit on trial, and were necessarily determined by the first verdict.3 If a former adjudication is not pleaded as an estoppel evidence may be received to show the truth.4 It cannot be said that a case is not an authority on one point because, although that point was properly presented and decided, something else was found in the end which disposed of the whole matter. See ADJUDICATUS, Res, etc. L. Decided, settled, adjudged, adjudicated, q. v. Res adjudicata, or res judicata. A thing adjudicated; a case decided; a matter settled. Plural, res adjudicatæ or judicata. 1 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 251-58 (1876), cases, Field, J.; ib. 364-66, cases; Lumber Company v. Buchtel, 101 id. 639 (1879); Litchfield v. Goodenow, 123 id. 550-51 (1887): 1 Greenl. Ev. § 523; Gilmer v. Morris, 30 F. R. 459 (1887), cases. Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 608 (1876), cases, Field, J.; Corcoran v. Chesapeake, &c. Canal Co., ib. 745 (1876). See also Foye v. Patch, 132 Mass. 109-11 (1882), cases; McCalley v. Robinson, 70 Ala. 433 (1881); Moore v. City of Albany, 98 Ν. Υ. 410 (1885); Withers v. Sims, 80 Va. 651 (1885); Bennitt v. Star Mining Co., 119 III. 14-15 (1886), cases. • Wilson's Executor v. Deen, 121 U. S. 525, 533 (1887). Meiss vm, 44 Ohio St. 258-60 (1886), cases. • Railroad Companies v. Schutte, 103 U. S. 143 (1880).

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