Definition
Actiones nominatæ (singular: actio nominata) were, in the English Court of Chancery, those writs for which established precedents already existed — named, recognized forms of action that the clerks of Chancery were authorized to issue as a matter of course. The term is Latin for "named actions." A litigant whose grievance fit a recognized writ could obtain it without special authorization; a litigant whose grievance did not fit an existing form was left without a remedy unless the court found authority to create a new one.
The concept is inseparable from its counterpart and practical consequence: the Statute of Westminster II (1285), c. 24, which granted Chancery authority to fashion new writs in consimili casu — that is, in cases similar to those already covered by existing writs. Where the actiones nominatæ left gaps, this statutory power authorized extension by analogy, and from that extension grew the action on the case, one of the most consequential procedural developments in the common law.
---
Common Confusion
Actiones nominatæ is sometimes loosely conflated with the broader Roman law distinction between actiones in personam and actiones in rem, or with the general Roman taxonomy of named versus praetorian actions. While the underlying logic shares a Roman inheritance — Roman law similarly distinguished between formulary actions with established names and those fashioned by the praetor — the specific English chancery usage is a distinct, technical concept rooted in the writ system and medieval English procedure. Researchers should not import Roman law commentary wholesale when working with the English chancery context.
---
Why It Matters in Research
This term is a gateway concept for understanding the architecture of the common law writ system and the procedural history of English civil actions. Several research traps apply:
The writ system and its categories collapsed gradually over centuries, culminating in the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 in England and equivalent reforms in American jurisdictions. Sources before and after these reforms use procedural vocabulary in fundamentally different ways. A researcher reading a 17th-century chancery pleading encounters a world where the availability of a named writ was itself a dispositive question; post-reform sources treat that question as moot.
The term almost never appears in modern American legal materials. When it surfaces, it is nearly always in a historical or comparative context — either tracing the lineage of a particular cause of action or situating the action on the case within its procedural origins. Researchers tracing the development of negligence, nuisance, or assumpsit will encounter this term as background infrastructure.
The connection to the Statute of Westminster II is critical. That statute's in consimili casu clause is the hinge between the closed world of actiones nominatæ and the more flexible common law that followed. Any corpus research touching on the origins of the action on the case should treat these concepts as a cluster: actiones nominatæ, in consimili casu, and action on the case belong together analytically.
Chancery records from the medieval and early modern period will use Latin form throughout. Researchers working with those primary sources need to recognize the term on sight; the anglicized "named actions" rarely appears in the sources themselves.
---
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary (2nd Ed.) provides the essential entry: "In the English chancery. Writs for which there were precedents. The statute of Westminster, 2, c. 24, gave chancery authority to form new writs in consimili casu; hence the action on the case."
This is a compact but accurate summary. Black's correctly identifies the English chancery context, the precedent-based nature of the category, and the statutory mechanism that allowed expansion beyond named writs. What the entry does not do is situate the term within the broader arc of common law procedural history or explain why the gap-filling mechanism was necessary — namely, that the rigidity of the writ system meant that novel injuries went unredressed unless a new writ could be justified.
Earlier legal dictionaries and institutional writers (Glanvill, Bracton, and later Blackstone in his Commentaries) address the writ system extensively without always using the phrase actiones nominatæ as a term of art. The concept is present in those sources even when the label is not. Researchers should search for the underlying idea — named writs, precedent-bound forms — rather than relying on the Latin phrase to surface all relevant materials.
---
Jurisdictional Note
The term is specific to English legal history and has no operative significance in modern American or English law. American courts and legislatures abolished the forms of action through code pleading reforms beginning in the mid-19th century. The term survives in legal scholarship and historical legal analysis only.
---