ACTIO VULGARIS

4 definitions found across Law Mind sources

ACTIO VULGARISAuthored
The Law Mind • 764 words
Definition
A Roman civil law term meaning "common action" or "legal action." Actio vulgaris refers to an action of ordinary, established type — one that proceeds along the standard, recognized form recognized by the civil law, as distinguished from actions of a more exceptional or derived character. The term is most frequently encountered as a synonym for actio directa: the direct or primary form of an action, as opposed to an actio utilis, which was an analogous action extended by praetorian authority to cover situations not originally contemplated by the strict civil law. The phrase is essentially a label of classification within the Roman taxonomy of civil actions, marking an action as belonging to the common, well-settled category rather than to any novel or exceptional class. ---
Common Confusion
Actio vulgaris and actio directa are used interchangeably in the historical dictionaries, and for most research purposes they may be treated as equivalent. However, precision requires noting that actio vulgaris emphasizes the commonness or ordinariness of the action (its contrast is with anything exceptional or unusual), while actio directa emphasizes its direct, primary character (its contrast is specifically with actio utilis, the analogous action). The terms overlap substantially but carry slightly different conceptual emphases. Researchers encountering either term in a Roman law or civil law context should cross-check against the other. ---
Why It Matters in Research
This term will appear almost exclusively in one context: historical legal writing that draws on Roman civil law, particularly treatises, digests, and early American and English common law scholarship that reference the civilian tradition. It is not a working term of modern American or English common law practice. The primary research trap is treating actio vulgaris as a distinct, independently significant category when it is better understood as a taxonomic label. The historical dictionaries do not fully disaggregate the Roman system of actions, so a researcher unfamiliar with that system may encounter this term without sufficient context to interpret it. The key anchor is Mackeldey's Roman Law (cited by both Black's and Bouvier's), which provides the systematic framework within which the term has meaning. Within the Law Mind corpus, actio vulgaris is unlikely to appear as a standalone doctrinal concept. It surfaces as a cross-reference point when historical sources discuss the structure of Roman civil actions, the actio directa/actio utilis distinction, or the reception of Roman procedural categories into civilian jurisdictions. Researchers working on civil law jurisdictions — Louisiana, Quebec, or comparative private law — may encounter it in foundational or historical treatments. The term also signals the level of Roman law literacy of a source. Writers who use actio vulgaris with precision are working within the classical civilian tradition; those who use it loosely or interchangeably with all manner of Roman action terms may be working at second or third remove from primary sources. ---
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's, Bouvier's, and Burrill's are in full agreement on the substance: all three define actio vulgaris as a common or legal action, and all three note its use as an alternate name for actio directa. All three cite Mackeldey as authority, indicating that the nineteenth-century American legal dictionaries drew from the same civilian secondary source rather than independently from Roman primary texts. Burrill adds a citation to Bracton (fol. 103a), which is notable: it places the term in the English common law tradition through Bracton's engagement with Roman law, suggesting the term had some circulation in early English legal writing, not only in continental civilian sources. This is a detail neither Black's nor Bouvier's supplies and is worth flagging for researchers interested in the civilian influence on early common law. What the historical dictionaries do not provide is any systematic account of where actio vulgaris fits within the broader Roman classification of actions — a gap that limits their usefulness for anyone trying to understand the term in context rather than merely identify it. Mackeldey's treatise itself remains the more useful source for that purpose. ---
Jurisdictional Note
Actio vulgaris has no operative meaning in American common law or modern statutory systems. It retains significance as a historical and comparative term in civil law jurisdictions and in scholarship on the Roman foundations of private law. Louisiana legal history is the most likely domestic context in which it could appear with more than passing reference. ---
Related Terms
Actio directa | Actio utilis | Actio in personam | Actio in rem | Civil law | Roman law | Action (civil) | Praetorian action | Bracton
ACTIO VULGARISmain
Black's Law Dictionary • 1891
In the civil law. A legal action; a common action. Some- times used for actio directa. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 207.
ACTIO VULGARISmain
Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928
In Civil Law. A legal action; a common action. Some- times used for actio directa. 1 Mackeldey, Civ. L. 189. ACTION (Lat. agere, to do; to lead; to conduct). A doing of something; some- thing done. In Practice. The formal demand of one's right from another person or party, made and insisted on in a court of justice. In a quite common sense, action includes all the formal proceedings in a court of justice attendant upon the demand of a right made by one person or party of another in such court, including an adjudication upon the right and its enforcement or denial by the court. In the Institutes of Justinian an action is defined as jus persequendi in judicio quod sibi debetur (the right of pursuing in a judicial tribunal what is due one's self); Inst. 4. 6. 6.. In the Digest, however, where the signification of the word is expressly treated of, it is said, Actio generaliter, sumitur; vel pro ipso jure quod quis habet persequendi in judicio quod suum est sibi ve debetur; vel pro hac ipsa persecu- tione seu juris exercitio (Action in general is taken either as that right which each one has of pursuing in a judicial tribunal his own or what is due him; or as the pursuit itself or exercise of the right); Dig. 50. 16. 16. Action was also said continere for- mam agendi (to include the form of proceeding); Dig. 1. 2. 10. This definition of action has been adopted by Mr. Taylor (Civ. Law, p. 50). These forms were pre- scribed by the prætors originally, and were to be very strictly followed. The actions to which they applied were said to be stricti juris, and the slightest variation from the form prescribed was fatal. They were first reduced to a system by Appius Claudius, and were surreptitiously published by his clerk, Cneius Flavius. The publication was so pleasing to the people that Flavius was made a tribune of the people, a senator, and a curule edile (a somewhat more magnificent return than is apt to await the labors of the editor of a modern book of forms); Dig. 1. 2. 5. These forms were very minute, and included the form for pronouncing the decision. In modern law the signification of the right of pursuing, etc., has been generally dropped, though it is recognized by Bracton, 98b; Coke, 2d Inst. 40; 8 Bla. Com. 116; while the two latter senses of the exercise of the right and the means or method of
ACTIO VULGARISmain
Burrill's Law Dictionary • 1867
In the civil law. A common action; another name for the actio directa. 1 Mackeld. Civ. Law, 189, §194. Bract. fol. 103 a.

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