ity in the amount requi ed. Our knowledge of all these actions is exceedingly slight, being derived from fragments of the earlier jurisprudence pre- served in literary works, laboriously pieced to- gether by commentators, and the numerous gaps Alled out by aid of ingenious and most copious con- Jectures. They bear all those marks which might have been expected of their origin in a barbarous or semi-barbarous age, among a people little skilled in the science of jurisprudence, and having no ac- quaintance with the refined distinctions and complex business transactions of civilized life. They were all of that highly highly symbolical character found among men of rude habits but lively imaginations. They abounded in sacramental words and significant gestures, and, while they were inflexibly rigid in their application, they possessed a character almost sacred, so that the mistake of a word or the omission of a gesture might cause the loss of a suit. In the nature of things, such a system could not maintain itself against the advance of civilization, bringing with it Increased complications in all the relations of man to man; and accordingly we find that it gradually, but sensibly, declined, and that at the time of Justinian not a trace of it existed in practice. See 8 Ortolan, Justinian 467 et seq. About the year of Rome 507 began the introduc- tion of the system known as the procedure per formulam or ordinaria judicia. An important part of the population of Rome consisted of foreigners, whose disputes with each other or with Roman citizens could not be adjusted by means of the actiones leges, these being entirely confined to ques- tions of the strict Roman law, which could only arise between Roman citizens. To supply the want of a forum for foreign rest- dents, a magistrate, the prætor peregrinus, was constituted with jurisdiction over this class of suits, and from the procedure established by this new court sprang the formulary system, which proved so convenient in practice that it was soon adopted in suits where both parties were Roman citizens, and gradually withdrew case after case from the domain of the legis actiones, until few questions were left in which that cumbrous procedure con- tinued to be employed. An important feature of the formulary system, though not peculiar to that system, was the distinc- tion between the jus and the judicium, between the magistrate and the judge. The magistrate was vested with the civil authority, imperium, and that Jurisdiction over law-suits which in every state is Inherent in the supreme power; he received the parties, heard their conflicting statements, and re- ferred the case to a special tribunal of one or more persons, judex, arbiter, recuperatores. The func- tion of this tribunal was to ascertain the facts and pronounce judgment thereon, in conformity with a special authorization to that effect conferred by the magistrate. Here the authority of the judge ended; if the defeated party refused to comply with the sentence, the victor must again resort to the magistrate to enforce the judgment. From this it would appear that the functions of the judge or judges under th the Roman systein corresponded in many respects with those of the jury at common law. They decided the question of fact submitted to them by the magistrate, as the jury decides the issue eliminated by the pleadings; and, the decision made, their functions ceased, like those of the jury. As to the amount at stake, the magistrate, in cases admitting it, had the power to fix the sum in dis pute, and then the judge's duties were confined to the simple question whether the sum specified was due the plaintiff or not; and if he Increased or diminished this amount he subjected himself to an action for damages. In other cases, instead of a precise sum, the magistrate fixed a maximum sum, beyond which the judge could not go in ascertain- ing the amount due; but in most cases the magis- strate left the amount entirely to the discretion of the judge. The directions of the magistrate to the judge were made up in a brief statement called the formula, which gives its name to this system of procedure. The composition of the formula was governed by well-established rules. When complete, it consisted of four parts, though some of these were frequently omitted, as they were unnecessary in certain classes of actions. The first part of the formula, called the demonstratio, recited the subject sub- mitted to the judge, and consequently the facts of which he was to take cognizance. It varied of course, with the subject-matter of the suit, though each class of cases had a fixod and appropriate form. This form, in an action by a vendor against his ven- dee, was as follows: "Quod Aulus Agerius Numerio Negidio hominem vendidit;" or, in case of a bail- ment, "Quod Aulus Agerius apud Numerium Negi- dium hominem deposuit." The second part of the formula was the intentio in this was stated the claim of the plaintiff, as founded upon