A second or additional judgment given against one who has been convicted, the execution or effect of which is to commence after the first has expired. Thus, where a man is sentenced to an imprison- ment for six months on conviction of larceny, and afterwards he is convicted of burglary, he may be sentenced to undergo an imprisonment for the latter crime, to commence after the expiration of the first imprisonment: this is called an accumula- tive judgment. And if the former sentence is short- ened by a pardon, or by reversal on a writ of error, It expires, and the subsequent sentence takes effect, as if the former had expired by lapse of time; 11 Metc. 581. Where an indictment for misdemeanor contained four counts, the third of which was as held on error to be bad in substance, and the defendant, being convicted on the whole indictment, was sen- tenced to four successive terms of imprisonment of equal duration, one on each count, it was held that the sentence on the fourth count was not invalidated by the insufficiency of the third count, and that the imprisonment on it was to be computed from the end of the imprisonment on the count: 15 Q. B. 594. Upon an indictment for misdemeanor containing two counts for distinct offences, the defendant may be sentenced to imprisonment or penal servitude for consecutive terms of punishment, although the ag- gregate of the punishments may exceed the punish- ment allowed by law for one offence, and this rule is in many states prescribed by statute; 1 Bish. New Crim. Proc. $ 1827 (2); Whart. Cr. Pl. & Pr. 1982; 50 Kans. 299; 87 Neb. 454; 29 S. W. (Tex.) 174; 39 Pac. (Utah) 408. But it may in some cases be the means of perpetrating great injustice. See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, where a justice of the peace imposed a fine of $6638, and on failure to pay it, a sentence of nearly 60 years' imprisonment, for sell- ing intoxicating liquors. The Supreme Court of the United States refused to interfere. See 31 Am. L. Reg. 619. Upon an indictment for perjury charging offences committed in different suits, the defendant, upon conviction, may be sentenced to distinct punish- ments, although the suits were instituted with a common object; 5 Q. B. Div. 490. In New York, it has been held that where upon trial of an indictment containing several counts- charging separate and distinct misdemeanors, iden- tical in character, a general verdict of guilty is ren- dered, or a verdict of guilty upon two or more specified counts, the court has no power to impose a sentence or cumulative sentences exceeding in the aggregate te what is prescribed by statute as the max- imum punishment for one offence of the character charged; 60 N. Y. 559; but this case stands alone, and has been rejected by every court to which it has been cited as authority. See 1 Bish. New Cr. Proc. $1827 (2); 6 App. Cas. 241.