Definition
An accessory action is a proceeding that is subservient or auxiliary to a principal action — that is, a lawsuit brought not to resolve a primary dispute on the merits, but to support, enable, or give legal effect to another proceeding. The term is drawn from Scots law and has no direct modern American or English common law equivalent.
Two historically recognized examples illustrate the concept:
1. Actions of proving the tenor: Proceedings by which a lost deed or document is restored through proof of its original contents, allowing the instrument to be treated as legally operative despite the loss of the original.
2. Actions of transumpts: Proceedings by which certified copies of principal deeds are authenticated and given legal standing, in effect substituting an official copy for the original document.
In both cases, the accessory action serves the principal document or proceeding rather than standing independently. The action's entire purpose is instrumental — it clears an evidentiary or procedural obstacle so that another legal right or instrument can function.
Common Confusion
Despite the word "accessory" in the title, accessory action has no connection to the criminal law concept of an accessory to a crime (i.e., a party who aids or abets a principal offender). The two terms share etymological roots — both derive from the Latin accessorius, meaning something that accompanies or assists — but they operate in entirely different legal domains. Researchers encountering "accessory" in a Scots law procedural context should not import criminal law meanings.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers are most likely to encounter this term in older legal dictionaries, Scots law materials, or secondary sources discussing historical Scottish civil procedure. A few navigational points:
Jurisdictional confinement. The term is a creature of Scots law and appears rarely, if ever, in English common law or American jurisprudence under this label. Primary sources outside the Scottish legal tradition will not use this terminology. If you encounter it in a citation trail, the underlying authority will almost certainly trace back to Scottish civil practice.
Functional equivalents exist elsewhere. Many legal systems have procedural mechanisms that perform analogous functions — proceedings to restore lost instruments, to authenticate copies, or to establish the contents of destroyed documents — but they operate under different names. American courts address similar needs through doctrines governing secondary evidence, document restoration, or authentication under evidence rules. Conflating the label with the function can lead to misdirected research.
Bell's Dictionary as the authoritative source. All three historical dictionary entries in the Law Mind corpus cite Bell's Dictionary as the primary authority. Researchers tracing this term to its source should consult that Scottish legal reference rather than treating the dictionary entries as freestanding authority.
The term does not appear to have evolved significantly over time — the entries across Black's first edition, the supplemental second edition, and Burrill's are nearly verbatim. This uniformity suggests the term was carried forward as a discrete reference without substantive development in the common law dictionary tradition.
Historical Dictionary Support
All three dictionary entries in the Law Mind corpus — Black's (1st Ed.), Black's (2nd Ed.) Supplemental, and Burrill's — present nearly identical definitions, each attributing the term to Bell's Dictionary of Scots Law. The agreement is complete: no source diverges on meaning, scope, or the two illustrative examples. This uniformity reflects the fact that none of the major common law dictionaries attempted to expand or adapt the concept beyond its Scots law origins — they preserved it as a foreign procedural term rather than integrating it into common law doctrine.
Burrill's entry and both Black's entries use the phrase "subservient or auxiliary to another" as the core definition, suggesting direct reliance on a shared source rather than independent analysis. No entry attempts to analogize the concept to English or American practice, which is consistent with the term's limited influence outside its jurisdiction of origin.
What the historical sources do not address: None of the entries discuss whether accessory actions survive as a distinct procedural category in modern Scots law, nor do they indicate whether either type of action (proving the tenor or transumpts) has been superseded by statutory procedure. Researchers needing current Scots law practice should look beyond these dictionary entries entirely.
Jurisdictional Note
Accessory action is a term of Scots law with no recognized counterpart in English common law or American jurisprudence under this name. Researchers working in U.S. or English legal materials should treat this as a historical foreign law reference rather than operative authority.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
Note: The term "accessory" in accessory action is procedural, not criminal. For the unrelated criminal law concept of accessories to a crime, see: Parties to a Crime (Principals and Accessories), The Law Mind Criminal Law Encyclopedia.